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The public nature of basic scientific knowledge had been emphasized in the seminal 
contributions of Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962) to what has been described as the ‘old’ economics of 
basic research. We owe to Robert Merton (1957, 1961, 1973, 1988), the founder of the modern 
sociology of science, the recognition at about the same time of crucial non-market aspects in the reward 
structure in science around the priority of discovery as a form of property right. The genius of Merton is 
that he stood the public-private distinction on its head, proposing that the search for priority 
functioned to make a public good private (Stephan, 2004).1   
Linking rewards to priority sets up a contest, a race, for scientific discoveries. The allocation of 
rewards takes many forms, depending upon the importance that the scientific community attaches to 
the discovery in question. Publication –a necessary step in establishing priority– is a lesser form of 
recognition within the reach of most scientists. In Merton’s (1957, p. 237) words, “For most of us artisans 
of research, getting things into print becomes a symbolic equivalent to making a scientific discovery.” Formal and 
informal procedures to grant academic tenure, promotions, resources for research, and entrance to 
professional societies are increasingly connected to publication and citation counts that are readily 
observable. There is also a large literature on the roles of the quantity and the citation impact of 
publications in salary determination.2 Finally, it has been argued that the advantage of taking scientists 
as an object of study in labor economics is that information about research productivity –the subject 
matter of this paper– is available through bibliographic databases (Coupé et al., 2006).  
1 Specifically, Merton (1988, p.620) wrote: “I propose the seeming paradox that in science, private property is established by having its 
substance freely given to others that may want to make use of it.” In the words of David (1994, p.70), “Recognition of one’s contributions 
and consequent collegiate reputation, or esteem in the eyes of one’s scientific colleagues, is the key currency of the open science reputation system”. 
The ‘new’ economics of science arises as the synthesis between two sets of ideas: (i) the insights from the early sociology of 
science and the old economics of science; and (ii) the modern literature on behavior under incomplete and asymmetric 
information, as well as the dynamics of waiting and winner-takes-all or tournament games. See the excellent survey by 
Dasgupta and David (1994), as well as Stephan (2010), which builds upon Stephan (1996). 
2 For economics, see inter alia Hamermesch et al. (1982), Diamond (1986), Hamermesch (1989), Kenny and Studley (1995), 
Hamermesch and Schmidt (2003), Moore et al. (1998, 2001), and Ragan et al. (1998). Even the reputation of academic 
economists has been separately linked to these observables in Hamermesch and Pfann (2012). 
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Consider the possibility of measuring the productivity of scientists in terms of publications, 
weighted by the citation impact of the journals where each article is published in the periodical 
literature. The distribution of individual researchers’ productivities has been known for some time to be 
extremely unequal, being characterized –in each of many different research areas– by a long upper tail 
in the frequency distribution of the number of papers published in a specified time interval.3 This paper 
is a contribution to the measurement of the evolution of scientific productivity. Its distinctive feature is 
that, since a productivity distribution can be identified with an income distribution, in a dynamic 
context it is useful to measure productivity mobility using an income mobility index.  
There are many ways of measuring income mobility. More than 20 measures have been used in the 
literature and, as emphasized in the recent survey by Fields (2008), there are six different mobility concepts. 
In this paper, we choose the concept of mobility as an equalizer of long-term productivities. Also, as in the 
seminal papers by Miranda (1982, 1984) and King (1983), we restrict ourselves to a two-period world. In a 
two persons world, this mobility notion would judge that a pattern of productivity change in the two 
periods (1, 3) → (1, 5) would disequalize life cycle productivity relative to the initial period, while a pattern (1, 
3) → (5, 1) would equalize life cycle productivity relative to the initial period.  
In particular, we choose the mobility index suggested by Fields (2010) for a two period world, 
according to which if aggregate productivity inequality decreases (increases) relative to the initial situation, 
then productivity mobility takes a positive (negative) sign.4 This index choice is motivated by the following 
two stylized facts that, according to David (1994, p.72), appear to characterize the evolution of scientists’ 
productivity over time.  
3 See the landmark paper by Alfred Lotka (1926), as well as the book by Derek deSolla Price (1963) that starts the modern 
quantitative study of science. “Lotka’s law” states that if k is the number of scientists that publish one paper, then the 
number publishing n papers is k/n2. In many disciplines, approximately 6% of publishing scientists produce half of all 
papers. “Price’s Law” indicates that one half of the total output of papers published by a population of P scientists will be 
the work of P1/2 most productive members. 
4 From a positive point of view, the Fields index is essentially equivalent to the income mobility index first suggested by 
Chakravarty et al. (1985). See Fields (2010) for a discussion and the precise relationship between the two indices. 
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(1) “The arresting observation … is not simply that there are unusually marked inequalities in ‘publication 
attainments’ among scientists during a given time interval, but, rather, that the pronounced productivity stratification in science 
existing at any moment reflects the persistence of a particular hierarchical ordering throughout most of the life of a cohort.”  
(2) In both true and synthetic cohort data, “the dispersion of current period rates is found to increase over the 
professional life of the cohort”.  
The interest of the Fields framework is that it perfectly accommodates these two facts. In a dynamic 
context, there are different types of productivity changes taking place simultaneously. For our purposes, it is 
convenient to distinguish between rank reversals, or changes in the individuals’ relative positions in the 
productivity scale, and changes in cross-section productivity inequality in different time periods. Applying 
the arguments in Ruiz-Castillo (2004), it will be seen that the Fields index can be conveniently decomposed 
into two terms that reflect these two types of productivity change. The first term captures so-called exchange 
mobility (EM hereafter), namely, the effect of rank reversals, or re-rankings between the first- and second-
period productivity distributions. It can be shown that the re-rankings equalizing effect causes EM to be 
positive. David’s fact (1) indicates that there is a lot of persistence in researchers’ productivity over time or, 
in other words, few re-rankings. Similarly, Kelchtermans and Veugelers (2011, p. 296) state “There is 
remarkable little turbulence, with top researchers more likely to repeat top performances, and similarly at the bottom of the 
distribution.” Hence, we should expect a positive but small contribution to overall mobility from EM. The 
second term in the decomposition captures so-called structural mobility (SM hereafter), namely, the effect of 
changes in productivity inequality between the aggregate and the initial productivity once all re-rankings 
have been eliminated. It can be shown that a decrease in productivity inequality from the first to the second 
period causes SM to be positive. However, there are counterexamples to the opposite statement even in the 
absence of rank reversals. Nevertheless, we expect that an increase in productivity inequality from the first 
to the second period as indicated in fact (2) might generally cause SM to be negative. As a matter of fact, we 
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interpret the quotation from Davis (1972) as indicating that, because the second effect may dominate the 
first one, we should expect overall mobility to be disequalizing. 
We begin with a dataset consisting of the publications of 2,474 economists working in 81 of the best 
university economics departments in the world at the end of 2007. Therefore, this paper contributes to the 
literature on Economics of Economics recently surveyed by Coupé (2004). This dataset contains 
productivity information for every eight-year period after obtaining the PhD. For the study of productivity 
mobility in a two period world, we distinguish between several cohorts. For all cohorts, the first period 
always consists of the first eight years after the PhD. The second period varies in length, from the youngest 
cohort, for which it lasts only eight more years, to the oldest cohort, for which it lasts 32 or 49 more years. 
Thus, we focus on the sub-set of 1,136 economists that, counting from 2007, have spent at least 16 years in 
academic life since their PhD.  
We study the evolution of average productivity, productivity inequality, the extent of re-rankings, and 
productivity mobility for seven cohorts and the sample as a whole. The main findings are the following 
four. 1. Although average productivity decreases with the time elapsed since the PhD for the entire cohorts 
sample, top performers and the remaining individuals present very different patterns. 2. In agreement with 
fact 2 above, productivity inequality increases with time. 3. Although there is some hierarchical persistence, 
contrary to fact 1 above we find that among this sub-set of highly productive scholars there are a lot of rank 
reversals. 4. Thus, contrary to what we expected, productivity mobility is clearly equalizing in the youngest 
three cohorts, and it is clearly disequalizing only in the oldest cohort. 
The remaining part of the paper is organized in four Sections. Section II presents the Fields mobility 
index used in the paper. Section III describes the data and its organization into seven cohorts. Section IV is 
devoted to two types of empirical results: the evolution of average productivity and productivity inequality, 
two topics that have been quite extensively investigated in the past, and our results on productivity mobility 
that, as far as we know, appear here for the first time in the literature. Section IV concludes. 
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II. THE MEASUREMENT OF PRODUCTIVITY MOBILITY 
II.1. Notations and Definitions 
In a two-period world, let x  = (x1,…, xn) represent the productivity distribution of an n-person 
scientific community where individual i’s productivity level is the non-negative quantity xi
  ≥ 0. Assume that 
individual i’s productivity changes to yi ≥ 0 over a given time interval. We say that x has been transformed to y  
= (y1,…, yn), and denote this productivity transformation by x  → y . In what follows, in every transformation x  
→ y , productivity distribution x  will be ordered according to the “less than or equal” relation, so that x1 ≤ 
… ≤ xn. Each individual i is characterized by a productivity stream (xi
 , yi). Over the two periods, individual i 
produces the quantity xi + yi. The distribution x  + y  = (x1
 + y1,... , xn
 + yn) is referred to as the aggregate 
productivity  distribution. 
An index of mobility is a real valued function defined on the set of productivity transformations x  → 
y . As indicated in the Introduction, the mobility concept actually explored is the extent to which the 
mobility that takes place works to equalize longer-term productivities relative to the base, disequalizes 
longer-term productivities relative to the base, or has no effect. Given this context, we choose Fisher’s 
(2010) mobility measure defined by 
   M(x , y) = {I(x) - I(x + y)}/I(x),               (1) 
where I(.) is a Lorenz-consistent inequality measure. Therefore, whenever aggregate productivity inequality 
decreases (increases) relative to the productivity inequality in the first period, productivity mobility is 
positive (negative). An immobile income structure where aggregate productivity inequality coincides with 
productivity inequality in the first period is assigned a mobility value of zero (see Fields, 2010, for the 
properties satisfied by this measure).  
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Note that a distributional transformation x  → y  that involves only a change in scale causes no 
mobility, i. e., whenever y  = λx  for some λ > 0, M(x , λx) = 0. In other words, in this approach productivity 
growth per se has no mobility consequences. For M(x , y) ≠ 0, it is necessary that either I(x) ≠ I(y) or that 
there is some re-ranking, so that I(x) can be different from I(x  + y). Note that when M(x , y) ≠ 0, 
differences in mean productivity do affect productivity mobility, but only through their impact on I(x  + y).  
II. 2. Structural and Exchange Mobility  
Following the argument in Ruiz-Castillo (2004) for the Chakravarty et al. (1985) mobility index, the 
Fields mobility index can be decomposed into two terms: one capturing the change in inequality between 
the cross-section distributions x  and y  once all rank reversals have been removed, denoted by SM(x , y), and 
a second one capturing the re-rankings effect, EM(x , y). Given any distributional transformation x  → y , 
define ỹ as having the same components as y , but rearranged (if necessary) in the same increasing order as 
x . Of course, I(ỹ) = I(y). The following decomposition of the mobility index is now introduced 
 M(x , y) = SM(x , y) + EM(x , y),            (2) 
where  SM(x , y) = {I(x) - I(x + ỹ)}/I(x)  
  EM(x , y) = {I(x  + ỹ) - I(x  + y)}/I(x).  
The term SM(x , y) can be viewed as the productivity mobility associated with the distributional 
transformation x  → ỹ in which all the re-rankings between x  and y  have been eliminated, i. e. SM(x , y) = 
M(x , ỹ). Then, exchange mobility is defined as a residual, i. e. EM(x , y) = M(x , y) - M(x , ỹ). 
As indicated in Ruiz-Castillo (2004), we have the following two properties: 
 I(x) ≥ I(y) ⇒ SM(x , y) ≥ 0.        (3) 
Thus, whenever I(x) > I(y) the SM index captures the equalizing effect due to a decrease in cross-section or 
snapshot inequality. The opposite, even in the absence of rank reversals, need not be necessarily the case. 
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On the other hand, in the presence of some re-rankings, so that ỹ ≠  y , we always have  
 EM(x , y) > 0.           (4) 
 
In view of (3) and (4), for productivity mobility to be disequalizing we must have I(x) < I(y) causing a SM(x ,  
 
y) < 0 that in absolute value dominates EM(x , y). 
 
II. 3. Additive Decomposability  
In our context, it is always desirable to partition distribution x  into, say, C cohorts, indexed by c 
= 1,…, C, with xc = (x1
c,…, xnc
c), and Σc n
c = n. Note that, in this case, for each c productivity 
distribution xc is ordered according to the “less than or equal” relation, so that x1
c ≤ … ≤ xnc
c. In this 
way, we can study the dynamics involved in the C productivity transformations xc → yc, c = 1,…, C, 
where yc will typically cover periods of different length. In order to be able to express the productivity 
mobility for the entire population, M(x , y), in terms of the productivity mobility of each cohort, M(xc, 
y c), we must use an additively decomposable inequality index I in definitions (1) and (2). 
  For any population partition we are interested in expressing the overall productivity inequality as 
the sum of two terms: a weighted sum of within-group inequalities, plus a between-group inequality 
component. An inequality index is said to be decomposable by population subgroup, if the 
decomposition procedure of overall inequality into a within-group and a between-group term is valid 
for any arbitrary population partition. In the relative case, it is customary to calculate the between-
group component by applying the inequality index to a productivity vector in which each person in a 
given subgroup is assigned the subgroup’s mean productivity. Under this convention, it is well known 
that the GE (Generalized Entropy) family of inequality indices are the only measures of relative 
inequality that satisfy the usual properties5 required from any inequality index and, in addition, are 
decomposable by population subgroup (Bourguignon, 1978, and Shorrocks, 1980, 1984). Given the 
5 Namely, continuity, S-convexity, scale invariance, and invariance to population replications. 
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distribution z  = (z1,…, zN) with mean µ(z) = µ, the GE family can be described by means of the 
following convenient cardinalization: 
   Iα(z) = (1/N) (l/α
2 - α) Σi (zi/µ
α – 1), α ≠ 0,1; 
   I0(z) = (1/N) Σi log (µ/zi); 
   I1(z) = (1/N) Σi (zi/µ) log (zi/µ). 
The parameter α summarizes the sensitivity of Iα in different parts of the productivity distribution: the 
more positive (negative) α is, the more sensitive Iα is to differences at the top (bottom) of the 
distribution (Cowell and Kuga, 1881)). I1 is the original Theil index, while I0 is the mean logarithmic 
deviation.  
The weights in the within-group term add up to one only for I0 and I1. In the partition by 
cohorts, for example, in I0 and I1 these weights are the demographic and the productivity shares, 
respectively. In this paper we will use the I1 index, whose decomposition formula for the partition of x  
into C cohorts is the following: 
         I1(x) = Σc vc I1(x
c) + I1(µ
1,..., µC),   (5) 
where vc is the share of total productivity in distribution x  held by individuals in cohort c, and I1(µ
1,..., 
µC) is the between-group inequality calculated as if each individual in cohort c received that cohort’s 
mean productivity µc in distribution x.  Similarly, for distribution (x  + y) we write: 
  I1(x + y) = Σc wc I1(x
c + yc) + I1(m
1,..., mC),  
where wc is the share of total productivity per year in distribution (x  + y) held by individuals in cohort c, 
and I1(m
1,..., mC) is the between-group inequality calculated as if each individual in cohort c received 
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that cohort’s mean productivity mc in distribution (x  + y).  Consequently, the overall productivity 
mobility using index I1, M1(x , y), can be expressed as follows: 
        M1(x , y) = {I1(x) - I1(x + y)}/I1(x)  
  = {[Σc vc I1(x
c) + I1(µ
1,..., µC)] - [Σc wc I1(x
c + yc) + I1(m
1,..., mC)]}/I1(x) 
              = Σc βc M1(x
c, yc) + {Σc (vc - wc) I1(x
c+ yc)}/I1(x) + {I1(µ
1,..., µC) - I1(m
1,..., mC)}/I1(x),        (6) 
where βc = vc [I1(x
c)/I1(x)]. Thus, overall productivity mobility is the sum of three terms: (i) the weighted 
sum of productivity mobility in each cohort, M1(x
c, yc), where cohorts with greater share of total 
productivity in distribution x , vc, and greater productivity inequality in the first period, I1(x
c), will carry a 
greater weight in that sum; (ii) the weighted sum of changes in the share of total productivity between 
distributions x  and (x  + y), {Σc(vc - wc) I1(x
c + yc)}/I1(x), and (iii) the difference in between-cohort 
productivity inequality from distributions x  and (x  + y), {I1(µ
1,..., µC) - I1(m
1,..., mC)}/I1(x). 
Finally, overall productivity mobility, M1(x , y), can be expressed as the sum of two terms SM(x , y) 
and EM(x , y) by using expression (2), where ỹ = (ỹ1,…, ỹC), and ỹc is defined as having the same 
components as y c, but rearranged (if necessary) in the same increasing order as xc. Of course, I(ỹ) = I(y). 
III. DESCRIPTION AND ORGANIZATION OF THE DATA 
 
III.1. The Original Dataset 
Our dataset has been constructed in two steps. Firstly, we select the top 81 Economics 
Departments in the world according to the Econphd (2004) university ranking that takes into account 
the publications in 1993-2003 in the top 63 journals in the Kalaitzidakis et al. (2003) journal ranking, 
where the journal quality weighting reflects citation counts, adjusted for factors such as the annual 
number of pages and the age of a journal (for further methodological details, see Econphd, 2004). 
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Typically, university rankings tend to coincide in the top 10 or 20 departments, but differences tend to 
increase as we proceed to larger sets. We have compared the Econphd ranking adopted in this paper 
with three other equally acceptable university rankings.6 The correlation coefficients are 0.73, 0.78, and 
0.81, which indicate that we are really dealing with a sensible selection of the best departments in the 
world circa 2007 –an interesting sample of the academic community for the study of productivity 
dynamics. 
Secondly, we visited the 81 departmental web pages to list the tenured and tenure-track faculty 
members at the end of 2007. We were able to find a total of 2,485 economists. Using the departmental 
and/or personal web pages we register information on (i) the number of years since the PhD was 
obtained, and (ii) the number of articles in four journal classes published each period of eight years, 
plus a residual period of a variable number of years until 2007 whenever necessary. The article count in 
our dataset made no distinction between single and multiple-authorship. Consequently, no correction 
for co-authorship could be implemented. Classes A, B and C consist of five, 34, and 47 journals, 
respectively, while class D consists of all other journals.7 Universities have been classified into five 
groups: two within the U.S.; two within the European Union (EU), namely, the 15 member countries 
before the 2004 accession, and the Rest of the World (RW), consisting of four Canadian, two Israeli, 
and one Chinese university. Of the 2,485 individuals, 62.3% belong to U.S. universities, 30.9% to 
European universities, and the remaining 6.8% to the RW. The percentage of females is 14.2, while the 
average number of years since the PhD for the 2,231 individuals with this information is 17.8. 
III.2. The Measurement of Productivity 
6 The first two are based on the publications during 1990-2000 in the 71 journals in Laband and Piette (1994), and in the 
journals ordered by the mean rank according to 12 different criteria (for both of them, see Coupé, 2003). The third ranking 
is based on the publications in 1995-1999 in the top 30 journals in the Kalaitzidakis et al. (2003) journal ranking. For a 
discussion of these and other alternative rankings, see Ruiz-Castillo (2008). 
7 In brief, starting from the top 63 journals in the Kalaitzidakis et al. (2003) journal ranking, the different classes have been 
constructed taking also into account the rankings in Lubrano et al. (2003), and Kodrzycki and Yu (2006). The details, as well 
as a listing of all journals are in Appendix A. 
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We work with two possible productivity indices: one based on the number of publications, P, and 
another quality index based on a particular weighting of the different publication classes already described. 
After some experimentation, a quality index Q for each researcher has been constructed by applying the 
following weighting system (very close to the one in use at our own department in 2007): class A (five 
journals), 40 points; class B (34 journals), 15 points, class C (48 journals), 7 points, and class D, 1 point.8  
The university listing, together with information on the number of faculty members, the total of 
publications in each class, and the two productivity indices we use can be found in Appendix B. The 
following four features should be noted. Firstly, the average productivity for the entire sample is 25.2 
publications per capita, and 298.3 quality points per capita, equivalent to 7.5 articles of class A or almost 20 
articles of class B. Both measures clearly indicate that we are indeed working with a very productive sample. 
Secondly, the coefficient of correlation between the two productivity measures is 0.80. On the other hand, 
columns 9 and 10 in Appendix B include the university rankings according to P and Q. Not surprisingly, the 
coefficient of correlation between the rankings is 0.86. Furthermore, the correlation coefficients between 
the Econphd ranking (column 1 in Appendix B) and columns 9 and 10 are 0.84 and 0.70, respectively. 
These figures indicate that the two measures are capturing approximately the same phenomenon. Thirdly, 
since the weighting system introduces strong differences among journals in the four classes, we expect the 
index Q to exhibit more productivity inequality than index P. Indeed, the coefficients of variation of the two 
indices are 1.108 and 1.259, respectively. Finally, as indicated in the Introduction, productivity distributions 
are typically highly skewed. We use the Characteristic Scores and Scales (CSS hereafter) technique, 
introduced by Schubert et al. (1987) in the analysis of citation distributions, to describe this characteristic. 
8 Oster and Hamermesch (1998) use the Laband and Piette (1994) weights that, as in our case, distinguish strongly between 
journals. Rauber and Ursprung (2008) use the Combes and Linneman (2003) weights that lie between unity for five top 
journals, 2/3 for sixteen journals, down to 1/12 for the lowest quality journals –a more egalitarian scheme than our own. 
Coupé et al. (2006) use the average of the rankings based on 12 different weighting schemes computed in Coupé (2003). In 
order to assess the different degree of elitism involved, Henrekson and Waldenström (2011) display the cumulative 
distribution of the weights attributed in three important measures of journal quality.  
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The CCS permits the partition of any productivity distribution into a number of classes as a function of 
their members’ citation characteristics. The following characteristic scores are determined: µ1 = mean of a 
productivity distribution; µ2 = mean productivity of individuals with productivity above µ1, and µ3 = mean 
productivity of the individuals with productivity above µ2. Consider the partition of the distribution into 
four broad classes: individuals with low productivity, smaller than or equal to µ1; individuals with an 
intermediate productivity, above µ1 and smaller or equal to µ2; individuals with a remarkable productivity, 
above µ2 and smaller or equal to µ3, and individuals with an outstanding productivity above µ3. Table 1 
includes the percentage of individuals in classes 1 and 4 in the two distributions, as well as the percentages 
of publications or quality points accounted for by these two classes when productivity is measured by P or 
Q. For distribution P, µ1 = 25.2, µ2  = 54.4, and µ3 = 86.8. Note that µ1 is 15.6 percentage points above the 
median. On the other hand, the top 12.1% of economists with a remarkable or outstanding productivity in 
classes 3 and 4 account for 40.2% of all publications. For distribution Q, µ1 = 319, µ2  = 719, and µ3 = 
1,170. Interestingly enough, distribution Q is only slightly more skewed than distribution P: the mean is 16.4 
points above the median, and the top 11.9% of economists in classes 3 and 4 account for 43.4% of all 
quality points.9   
Table 1 around here 
9 It is worth while pointing out that the skewness of these productivity distributions for economists is extremely similar to 
the one found for the citation distributions in 219 scientific sub-fields with the same technique: on average, the mean is 18.6 




The conclusion from this discussion is that both indices share similar characteristics and provide 
a similar picture of productivity in our sample. Therefore, in the sequel we will restrict ourselves to 
measuring productivity according to the quality index.10 
III.3. Cohorts’ Definitions 
 We assume that, in universities where the system is in place, the tenure-track period lasts, at a 
maximum, approximately six years. Since in Economics there are large publication lags, we have recorded 
the publications that actually appeared in the periodical literature in the first eight years after completion of 
the PhD. For universities where tenure is differently regulated, we still think that eight is a reasonable 
number of years for our first period, namely, for the productivity distribution x  introduced in Section II. 
The conditions under which academic scholars conduct their research and publication activity change over 
time.11 This is the reason why it is advisable to partition the sample into cohorts that include individuals with 
comparable research and publication opportunities. In our case, since we have information about 
publications every eight years, we choose seven cohorts. The first six cohorts consist of individuals who 
finished their PhD four years apart in 1991-88, 1987-84, 1983-80, 1979-76, 1975-72, and 1971-68, or 
individuals that finished their PhD form 16-19 to 36-39 years since 2007. There are only 55 economists that 
finished their PhD 40-43 years before 2007. Therefore, to increase the last cohort size we include people 
who received their PhD in 1967 or before, that is, who finished their PhD 40 or more years before 2007. 
The problem, of course, is that cohort members become less comparable. On the other hand, the extra 37 
oldest people with more than 43 years after their PhD may be expected to increase cohort variability, a 
feature we find interesting to monitor. At any rate, assuming that economists obtain their PhD at age 25 (at 
10 Admittedly, the quality index used is rather elitist –as it should be, in our opinion. Nevertheless, we have also considered a 
quite different alternative: instead of assigning weights 40, 20, 7, and 1 to classes A, B, C, and D, the second index assigns 
weights 20, 10, 5, and 1 to these classes. As we will see below, all our results are robust to this change. 
11 For example, the number of articles in top-5 journals is largely unchanged, while the number of economists vying for a 
slot in these journals has dramatically increased since the 1970s. Thus, it was much easier to publish there before (for those 
who seriously tried), than it is today.  
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the earliest), this cohort consists of 65-years-olds (at a minimum) in 2007, while the youngest cohort 
consists of 41-44-years-olds at that date.  
As we have seen, there are good a priori reasons to conduct the analysis by cohort. Nevertheless, 
independently of the empirical importance of cohort effects, we also find interesting to analyze results 
for the sample as a whole. After eliminating 1,084 recent PhDs who finished their studies in 1992 or 
afterwards, plus the 254 economists for which the variable “years since PhD” was missing and 11 for 
which the second period productivity was in doubt, we end up with a sample of 1,136 individuals 
classified in the seven cohorts just described. Since there are more females among recent PhDs, the 
percentage of females goes down to 7.6%, while the average number of years since the PhD increases 
to 26.6. Finally, the following two features should be enough to illustrate that this is indeed a subset of 
very productive economists. Firstly, only 42.8% of European academic economists published at least 
once in EconLit during 1971-2000 (Combes and Linnemer, 2003), while only 39% of a sample of 1,600 
economists graduating in 1969-1988 in the U.S. published at least one article, averaging 0.42 
publications per year in 126 journals (Hutchinson and Zivney, 1995). In comparison, all economists in 
the cohort sample have produced at least one article, and the average is 1.52 publications per year. 
Secondly, only 18.2% of the sample has no class A publication, while 23.5% published once or twice, 
and the remaining 58.3% three or more times in the top class. The average quality index is 18.2 per year 
that can be compared with the 15 points assigned to one article in class B.12 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
IV.1. The Evolution of Average Productivity 
12 Even in the original dataset, only 28 faculty members –all of them in the first eight or fewer years since graduating– did 
not publish at all. The 2,183 economists that had finished their PhD in 2006 or before had published on average 1.44 
publications and 17.25 quality points per year. 
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We are concerned with productivity transformations xc → yc, where the second period 
distribution, yc, refers to academic lives of different lengths for different cohorts CI,…, CVII. Since we 
have information about publications every eight years, we can compute the productivity over complete 




c, c = I,…, VII. As a matter of fact, 
CVII is the only cohort with four complete eight-year periods; CVI and CV have three complete eight-
periods; CIV and CIII have two, while the youngest CII and CI have only one. It is important to 
establish the relationship between this notation and the available data on the quality index. Let Ti
c be 
the number of years in 2007 since the i-th individual in cohort c finished her PhD, and let Qti
c be the 
quality index for this individual at time t  ≤ Ti





c -  Q8i
c. If individual i is in cohort IV, for example, then in addition we have: y1i
IV = Q16i




IV -  Q16i
IV, and so on for individuals in other cohorts. The information on the 
number of individuals, as well as average productivity for all cohorts in all possible periods is in Table 2. 
To make them comparable across cohorts, rows 6 to 8 include the average productivity per year for the 
two periods, x  and y , as well as the aggregate (x  + y) distribution, which we denote by µ(xc/8), µ[yc/(Tc 
- 8)], and µ[(xc + yc)/Tc], respectively. 
Table 2 around here 
Two points should be emphasized. Firstly, as expected, average productivity is very high indeed. 
In the first eight-year period, for example, it ranges from 159 in CI to 200 points in CVI, equivalent to 
four and more than five class A articles, respectively. Secondly, average productivity uniformly 
decreases with age in all cohorts. With the exception of CV, the difference between the average 
productivity per year in the first and the second period in the transformation xc → yc (see rows 6 and 7 
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in Table 2), increases as we proceed from cohort I to CVII. Such differences, however, are not very 
large: the average difference for all cohorts is six points, one point less than an article in class C. 
Moreover, this trend is offset by the fact that average productivity in xc tends to be higher in older 
cohorts. As a result, average productivity in the aggregate distribution is not very different across 
cohorts: it ranges from 16.5 to 21.1 points per year for CV and VII, respectively. We must conclude 
that no strong cohort effects are observed. 
In spite of having relatively little information on a few exogenous and institutional explanatory 
variables, it is illustrative to express these findings in a regression format. Table 3 includes the results of 
several regressions of productivity in terms of years since the PhD, this variable squared, six dummies 
for the first six cohorts, and a gender dummy as exogenous factors, and three dummies for university 
types –with type I to type IV representing the first 20 to the last 21 institutions in our listing of 81 
university departments as institutional factors (only variables with a significant effect are shown in 
Table 3). The regression in Panel A pools five equations  
 vki = a + b1 tki + b2 (tki)
2, 
for k = 1,.., 5, where:  
 v1i = xi
c, i = 1,.., nc, c = I, …, VII, and t1i = 8, 
 v2i = y1i
c, i = 1,.., nc, c = I, …, VII, and t2i = 16, 
 v3i = y2i
c, i = 1,.., nc, c = III, …, VII, and t3i = 24, 
 v4i = y3i
c, i = 1,.., nc, c = V, …, VII, and t4i = 32, 
 v5i = y4i
c, i = 1,.., nc, c = VII, and t5i = 40. 
Human capital models suggest a humped-shaped progression of individual research productivity 
because the stock of human capital needs to be built up at the beginning of the career while, due to the 
finiteness of life, no new investment offsets depreciation and net investment declines (eventually) over 
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time (Diamond, 1984). This is the pattern found in several studies investigating economists (Kenny and 
Studley, 1995, Oster and Hamermesch, 1998, and Baser and Pema, 2004); a set of Israeli scientists 
(Weiss and Lillard, 1982); five of the six areas of physics and earth sciences studied (Levin and Stephan, 
1991), and French condensed matter physicists (Turner and Mairesse, 2003). In agreement with this 
model, we should have b1 > 0 and b2 < 0. However, in Panel A we find that b1 < 0 and b2 is not 
significantly different from 0, that is, productivity decreases linearly with age (according to Diamond, 
1986, the quantity and quality of current output for Berkeley mathematicians also declines 
monotonically with age). Nevertheless, it should be noted that since our data refers to publications 
every eight years, we cannot test whether productivity raises sharply in an initial stage inside the first 
eight year period, as found in Bell and Seater (1978), Goodwin and Sauer (1995), and Hutchinson and 
Zivney (1995). 
Table 3 around here 
The literature abounds with cases of heterogeneity in patterns of productivity over time 
(Goodwin and Sauer, 1995, Grimes and Register, 1997, Oster and Hamermesch, 1998, Kelchtermans 
and Veugelers, 2011, 2012, and Rauber and Ursprung, 2008).13 Consequently, Table 3 also reports 
results for a partition of the sample into the top 20% of individuals in each cohort (Panel B), and the 
remaining 80% (panel C). A test shows that b1 and b2 are jointly significant in Panel B. However, now 
we have that b1 > 0 and b2 < 0, indicating that productivity of the most prolific economists slightly 
increases at a declining rate. On the other hand, b1 < 0 and b2 is not significantly different from 0 in 
Panel C, explaining these results for the sample as a whole in panel A. This might be explained by two 
13 Other studies, it should be said, find a very small age effect or no significant decline in productivity as experience 
increases (Hutchinson and Zivney, 1995, Hartley et al. 2001, and Gonzalez-Brambila and Veloso, 2007, among the most 
productive researchers in all areas of knowledge in Mexico). The most careful contribution to the identification issue, Hall et 
al. (2007) also concludes that the independent effect of the researcher age above and beyond that due to the cohort in which 
she entered and the year of publication is at most slight. 
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types of factors. Firstly, a stronger taste for “puzzle solving” for top researchers, a factor that when 
added to the objective function produces a flattening of the productivity profile (Levin and Stephan, 
1991), or a stronger taste for peer recognition and monetary rewards. Secondly, because institutional 
explanatory variables –such as research funding and promotion policies operate differentially across the 
distribution of scientific performance– as found by Kelchtermans and Veugelers (2011). 
In line with the literature, we find clear evidence that productivity of males is greater than the 
productivity of females (see inter alia Cole and Cole, 1973, Weiss and Lillard, 1982, Cole and 
Zuckerman, 1984, Long, 1992, Xie and Shauman, 1998, Turner and Mairesse, 2003, Gonzalez-Brambila 
and Veloso, 2007, Kelchtermans and Veugelers, 2007, 2011, and Rauber and Ursprung, 2008, as well as 
the discussion in Stephan, 2010). We also find that working in better universities increases individual 
productivity. However, except among the top producers where some younger cohorts are less 
productive, there is no evidence of cohort effects.14  
IV.2. The Evolution of Productivity Inequality 
Table 4 presents the evolution of productivity inequality in all cohorts. The main finding is that, as 
already discovered in the literature, except in two instances in CIII and CVII, productivity inequality tends 
to increase with age. Note that, as expected, the presence of a contingent of older people in the asymmetric 
construction of CVII manifests itself in greater variability in most periods. In any case, except in CIII, 
productivity inequality in yc is always greater than in distribution x
c for all c. This is also fact 2 in Davis 
(1994), quoted in the Introduction.  
Table 4 around here 
14 This is also the case in studies of the economic profession such as Goodwin and Sauer (1995), and Baser and Pema 
(2004). Vintage matters in Levin and Stephan (1991) but, with the possible exception of geology, more recent vintages are 
never found to be significantly more productive than earlier vintages. Cohort dummies increase over time in Rauber and 
Ursprung (2008), not because members of younger cohorts are more productive researchers than their older peers, but 
possibly because the German economics profession has increasingly been exposed to the Anglo-Saxon research tradition 
that stresses publication on a continuous basis. 
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The previous evidence, however, is rather weak. The classical contribution by Allison and Stewart 
(1974) uses low quality data: self-reported number of research publications through mailed 
questionnaires and telephone interviews in the last five years before 1966, and total citations in 1966 to 
works published at any previous time. Moreover, they have cross-section data for 1,922 researchers, 
broken down into eight age strata by the number of years since the PhD. Except for the 507 biologists 
in the sample, productivity inequality measured by the Gini index increases with age for 361 
mathematicians, 499 physicists, and 555 chemists. Using true cohort data for 239 chemists who had 
spent up to eight years since the PhD, and two cohorts of 271 and 286 biochemists after eight and 14 
career years, Allison et al. (1982) report increasing inequality for publication counts, but not for citations 
to all previous publications, grouped into three-year intervals. Similarly, Weiss and Lillard (1982) report 
that, along with mean, the variance of publications increases markedly over the first ten or 12 years in 
their pooled dataset for 1,000 Israeli scientists. 
IV.3. The Extent of Re-rankings 
Table 5 presents mobility matrices between the two periods –that is, between distributions xc and y c– 
for all cohorts. The following three points should be stressed. Firstly, if we define top productivity as 
belonging to the last quintile, then it is true that top productivity generally is persistent over time: top 
performers in distribution xc during the first eight years of academic life are more likely to reach top status 
also in distribution y c, 16, 24, 32, or 40 years after receiving the PhD. Using a panel dataset comprising the 
publications of biomedical and exact scientists at the KU Leuven in the period 1992-2001, Kelchtermans 
and Veugelers (2012) find a similar phenomenon. Secondly, in our case the pattern can be summarized as 
follows. The percentage of individuals in the top and bottom 20% of distribution xc that remain in the same 
quintile in distribution y c range from 49% to 64% in the first four cohorts. These percentages decrease in 
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the oldest cohorts to 45%-57% in CV and CVI, and to 33-47% in CVII.15 Thus, older age cohorts are 
slightly underrepresented at both the top and the bottom, a pattern not found in Kelchtermans and 
Veugelers (2012).  
Table 5 around here 
Finally, we should ask: is this persistence, particularly at the top, large or small? A researcher is 
considered in Kelchtermans and Veugelers (2012) as ‘persistent top’ if she belongs to the top performance 
category in every two-year window in 1992-2001. Only 61 individuals, about 6% of the sample are part of 
that category. In our case, we find 124 individuals, or 10.9% of the sample, belonging to the top quintile in 
their respective cohorts –a comparable proportion. Note that between 46% and 63% of individuals in the 
top 20% in distribution y c in all cohorts except CIV (where this figure is 38%) proceed from three –or even 
all four– of the other quintiles in distribution xc. Moreover, the degree of persistence in the intermediate 
quintiles representing 60% of the sample is even lower. For example, the diagonal element for the third 
quintile is between 24% and 31% in all cohorts, except CIII in which it is 19%. Thus, perhaps the main 
finding is that, contrary to fact (1) in Davis (1994) and the statement by Kelchtermans and Veugelers (2011) 
quoted in the Introduction, in our two-period world there are a lot of re-rankings. The consequence of such 
a high number of rank reversals is an important contribution of exchange mobility to overall productivity 
mobility with a positive sign. 
IV.4. Productivity Mobility 
Table 6 includes the most important results of the paper, concerning productivity mobility for all 
cohorts in selected transformations. Let us begin with the key transformation xc → y c for all cohorts c = 
I,…, VII. As we saw in Table 2, I1(x
c) < I1(y
c) for all c (except CIII). This causes SM1(x
c, y c) < 0 in all these 
15 For the entire sample, the percentage of individuals in the top and bottom 20% of their respective cohorts in the first period 
that remain in the same quintile in the second period is 48.9% and 52.4%. 
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six cases (see Row C in Table 4). However, the re-rankings reported in Table 3 cause EM1(x
c, y c) > 0 for all 
c (see Row B in Table 4). The latter effect is clearly stronger than the SM effect of the opposite sign in the 
three youngest cohorts, of very similar strength in CIV to CVI, and clearly weaker in CVII. For the three 
cohorts for which mobility is clearly equalizing, we can conclude that aggregate productivity inequality is 
8.7% to 18.8% smaller than productivity inequality in the first eight years of academic life, while in CVII 
aggregate productivity inequality is 5.6% greater than productivity inequality at the beginning of academic 
life (see Row A in Table 4). 
Table 6 around here 
For the sample as a whole, the first term in the decomposition presented in equation (6) in Section 
II.3 is the weighted sum of productivity mobility in all transformations xc → y c. Since M1(x
c, y c) < 0 only for 
c = VI, and VII, it comes as no surprise that the term Σc βc M1(x
c, yc) is positive but small. Since the other 
two terms in the decomposition are negative, we end up with a small negative value M1(x , y) = - 0.030. As 
can be observed in Table 4, rank reversals between distributions x  and y  imply that EM1(x , y) = 0.190. On 
the other hand, productivity inequality during the first period for the sample as a whole is not that different 
from productivity inequality in any cohort, that is, I1(x) is similar to I1(x
c) for each c. However, the 
heterogeneity of distribution y , which is the union of distributions y c of different length for each cohort, 
manifests itself in a high productivity inequality. Therefore, contrary to most cohorts, for the cohort sample 
as a whole the increase in productivity inequality slightly offsets the effect of rank reversals, so that overall 
productivity mobility, although small, is disequalizing. 
IV.5. The Skewness of Productivity Distributions 
As we saw in Table 1, the quality distribution Q –the analogue of distribution (x  + y)– for the 
entire, original sample was highly skewed. The last question we investigate is the skewness of 
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distribution (xc + y c) when we restrict ourselves to those individuals with at least 16 years since the PhD 
in 2007, and after changes in cross-section productivity inequality and re-rankings between distributions 
xc and y c have taken place. The relevant information is in Table 7. 
Table 7 around here 
To understand what type of distribution (xc + y c) we have after the dynamic processes we have 
analyzed in this paper, it is best to focus on the oldest cohorts CVI and CVII. After the intense re-
ranking process –particularly among the intermediate quintiles– documented in Table 5 and manifested 
in a large exchange mobility component, the type of skewness characterizing the productivity 
distribution of individuals at the end of their life cycle, after 36 or more years of academic life, is quite 
different from the skewness that characterizes the productivity distribution Q of all individuals in the 
original dataset (as well as citation distributions in all sciences, generally). In the latter case, about 88% 
at the bottom of the distribution (in classes 1 and 2) account for 55% of all quality points, while a small 
minority of 4.7% with outstanding productivity (above the characteristic score µ3) accounts for 23.4% 
of all quality points (see Table 1). Instead, for cohorts VI and VII, about 60% at the bottom account 
for only 30% of all quality points, while a large elite of about 20% of all economists with outstanding 
productivity accounts for half of all quality points.  
IV.6. Changing the Cohort Definition 
We believe that fixing the first period equal to the first eight years of academic life after the PhD, as 
we have done in this paper, is an acceptable choice worth investigating. However, one may wonder about 
the consequences of widening this length. Given the structure of our dataset, where productivity 
information comes in eight-year slots, our only opportunity is to define the first period as the first 16 years 
after the PhD. It seems natural to consider a second period of the same or greater length. We will consider 
two cohorts, say A and B, in which the second period consists of the next 16 to 19 years, or more than 24, 
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respectively. These coincide with the previous cohort V (167 individuals), and cohort VII (91 individuals), 
precisely the only cohorts for which overall productivity mobility was positive. 
It turns out that overall productivity mobility is negative and greater than before: aggregate 
productivity inequality increases by 4.9% and 16.4% relative to the first period of 16 years after the PhD, 
while this increase was equal to 5.6% for cohort VII and overall mobility was slightly equalizing for CV 
when the first period included only the first eight years of academic life. The conclusion is that doubling the 
number of years of the first period does not drastically alter the results. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS 
 
This paper has studied the evolution of the research productivity of a sample of 1,136 economists 
who, counting from 2007, have spent at least 16 years since their PhD in (some of) the best 81 economics 
departments in the world. Individual productivity is measured in terms of the number of publications in 
each of four classes, weighted according to a rather elitist scheme. The main novelty is the measurement of 
productivity mobility using an indicator inspired in the index of income mobility suggested by Fields (2010) 
for a two-period world in which the first period coincides with the first eight years after the PhD, and the 
second period varies in length for seven cohorts. Productivity mobility is equalizing (disequalizing) if the 
actual productivity inequality at the end of the life cycle is smaller (greater) than the productivity inequality 
that obtains in the initial situation, in which case the mobility index takes positive (negative) values. The 
Fields index can be conveniently decomposed into two terms: the exchange mobility term that captures the 
effect of rank reversals between the first and the second period and cause overall mobility to increase, and 
the structural mobility term that captures the effect of changes in productivity inequality between the 
aggregate and the initial productivity once all re-rankings have been eliminated. Productivity inequality is 
measured with the first Theil inequality index. The main findings are the following five.  
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 (i) For the top 20% of researchers in each cohort productivity slightly increases with time at a 
declining rate. For the remaining 80%, individual productivity linearly decreases with the number of 
years since the PhD. As indicated in Oster and Hamermesch (1998), without direct observation on how 
scholars’ use of time changes as they age, it is impossible to distinguish whether this relationship is due 
to natural declines in capacity or decreased incentives to produce. However, in their rich model, 
Kelchtermans and Veugelers (20011), for example, find no effects from teaching to research, so that a 
reduced teaching load for less productive researchers may not lead to an increase in publications. 
Productivity is also significantly larger for males, and for scholars working at the top 40 universities.  
(ii) As expected, productivity inequality tends to increase with age. It turns out that this makes 
structural mobility disequalizing for all cohorts except one.  
(iii). Exchange mobility is always equalizing. Moreover, since in this subset of highly productive 
scholars there is less persistence than expected, the exchange mobility effect is relatively large in all cohorts.  
(iv). In the first place, the end result is that overall mobility is clearly equalizing for the youngest three 
cohorts, where aggregate productivity inequality is 9% to 19% smaller than productivity inequality in the 
first period. In the oldest cohort, aggregate productivity inequality is 5.6% greater than productivity 
inequality in the first period, while in the remaining three cohorts total productivity mobility is close to zero. 
This makes the within-group term in the decomposition of the overall productivity mobility for the sample 
as a whole to be positive. However, overall mobility for the sample as a whole is slightly disequalizing: 
aggregate productivity inequality is 3% greater than productivity inequality in the first period. 
 (v) Consider the partition into individuals with low, intermediate, remarkable or outstanding 
productivity. The usual productivity distribution is highly skewed: the first two groups represent about 88% 
of the total and account for 55% of all quality points, and the last category –representing less than 5% of the 
total– accounts for more than 23% of the quality points. However, after the dynamics studied in this paper 
take place, individuals at the end of their life cycle in the first two groups are about 60% of the total with 
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less than 30% of all quality points, while there is a relatively large group of 20/25% researchers with 
outstanding productivity, accounting for 45/50% of all quality points.16 
Given the skewness of the citation distribution of articles in any journal, including an important 
percentage with zero citations, Seglen (1992, 1997) warns about the wisdom of judging the quality of 
individual publications –as we have done in this paper– by the citation impact of the journal where they 
have been published. Similarly, Oswald (2007) has shown that “It is better to write the best article published in 
an issue of a medium quality journal such as the Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics than all four of the worst 
four articles published in an issue of an elite journal like the American Economic Review.” Therefore, one way to 
improve upon the results presented in this paper is to introduce productivity measures based on the 
citation impact directly achieved by each individual publication. 
Quite independently of the productivity metric, this paper has studied a very peculiar sample of 
very productive scholars. We agree with Goodwin and Sauer (1995) that, given the skewness of 
publishing productivity, including the important percentage of individuals with zero publications, to 
study life cycle productivity in research it makes sense to focus on scholars at research-oriented 
institutions (see also Levin and Stephan, 1991). In any case, it might be interesting to extend this effort 
towards a representative sample of economists. It can be conjectured that, in a two-period world 
analogous to the one studied here, the presence of economists with an intermediate or low productivity 
would increase productivity inequality during the first period and, perhaps, during the second period. 
This may increase the structural mobility component. On the other hand, a more inclusive sample will 
push the highly productive to the top of the distribution. Some of the rank reversals observed in this 
paper within this elite will surely disappear, but it is impossible to conjecture the extent of re-rankings 
16 As indicated in note 9, we have replicated Tables 2, 4, 6, and 7 for a less elitist measure of productivity than the one 
introduced in Section III.2 (see Tables 8, 9, 10, and 11). Regression results and mobility matrices presented in Tables 3 and 
5, respectively, are available on request. With the exception that overall mobility for the sample as a whole is now slightly 
equalizing (2.1%) rather than the opposite (- 1.8%), all results are strikingly similar to the ones obtained with the first quality 
index. This contrasts with the main finding in Henrekson and Waldenström (2011) suggesting large discrepancies between 
seven measures of productivity in terms of both the rank order of Economics professors in Sweden and the absolute 
differences between their performances. 
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in the larger sample, and hence, the sign of overall productivity mobility.  
More importantly, since the evidence already quoted indicates that the age/productivity profile 
varies in different disciplines, it would be interesting to extend this paper to other scientific fields. In 
particular, it remains to be seen whether rank reversals –that have been seen to strongly qualify 
persistence in economics –also play a major role in other fields. 
Beyond the measurement exercise presented in this paper, scientific policy requires explanatory 
models of productivity dynamics. As David (1994, p. 74) notes: “the phenomena (of persistent scientific 
hierarchies) may be understood as arising from the interplay between a heterogeneous population of researchers, and an 
environment whose reward system acts to reinforce and amplify the effects of initially limited differences in productivity 
potential”. In our view, such interplay and possibly other factors should also account for the 
phenomenon unveiled here: the extent of rank reversals over time among the researchers’ elite in a 
world with a relatively short first period. 
Finally, consider all articles published in the same year in a scientific field, and allow for a flow of 
citations to arrive year by year. For those in charge of the evaluation of research units responsible for 
sub-samples of these citation distributions, it is important to know how long does it take for these 
distributions to stabilize and adopt the characteristic skewed shape we are familiar with. The shorter it 
takes, the easier the job of evaluation would be. By identifying a citation distribution with an income 
distribution, income mobility indexes can be profitably used to study the dynamics of citation 
distributions, exactly as we have done in this paper with productivity distributions. In particular, we 
may learn how long it takes for citation distributions to acquire their typical shape by observing when 






A CLASSIFICATION OF JOURNALS INTO FOUR GROUPS 
 
The following three references, whose merits will not be discussed here, have been taken into account. 
 
1. Kalaitzidakis et al. (2003) rank 159 journals from the Economics section of the SSCI (Social Science Citation Index) on the basis 
of the citations received during 1998 by the papers published during 1994-1998. The procedure takes into account the relative 
importance of the journal making each citation, and does not include self-citations, namely, citations made by one journal to 
papers published in that same journal.  
 
2. Lubrano et al. (2003) follow a mixed strategy: they start by entrusting to one of their members, Alan Kirman, the ranking of 
505 journals that come from the 680 journals in EconLit after eliminating those with fewer than ten articles in ten years. In a 
second phase, they gathered information on the number of citations which 307 journals receive. Finally, they asked Professor 
Kirman to modify his original ranking in light of this information. The result is a grouping of all the journals in six classes that 
contain six journals with ten points, 17 with eight (except for one with seven), 45 with six, and the remaining 437 with four, 
two, or one point. For certain purposes, these authors select the 68 journals with six or more points. 
 
3. Kodrzycki and Yu (2006) are the first to apply the method axiomatized by Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004) to a large set of 
journals.  
We are interested in classifying relevant international journals into three groups, classes A, B, and C, including all remaining 
journals in class D. Hopefully the first 60 or 70 journals in each of the 4 rankings already introduced are sufficiently 
overlapping.  
 
• We start from the first 30 journals in Kalaitzidakis et al. (2003). Class A, consisting of 5 journals, needs little justification.  
 
• There remain 25 journals from the initial list. To these, we add 4 top journals in non-Economics areas that are assigned 
eight (or seven) points in Lubrano et al. (2003): American Political Science, JASA, Michigan Law Review, and Yale Law Journal. Then 
we bring in four journals highly classified in Kodrzycki and Yu (2006), namely, those journals whose average rank goes from 
3.5 to 23 according to these authors: Journal of Finance, Journal of Money Credit and Banking, Brookings Papers, and Journal of 
Economic Growth. Class B is formed with these 25 + 4 + 4 = 33 journals. 
 
• Next, we consider the 34 journals ranked 31 to 64 in Kalaitzidakis et al. (2003). First, we add three journals with six points in 
Lubrano et al. (2003), clearly within the first 80 in Kodrzycki and Yu (2006), and within ranks 71-73 in Kalaitzidakis et al. 
(2003): Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Journal of Health Economics, and Regional Science and Urban Economics. Two more 
journals with six points in Lubrano et al. (2003) are included: Macroeconomic Dynamics and Industrial and Labor Relations Review. 
Second, we include eight journals whose average rank in Kodrzycki and Yu (2006) is within the 7-37 range: 2 Macro journals -
NBER Macroeconomic Annual and Review of Economic Dynamics- five Business and Financial Economics journals - Journal of 
Business, Journal of Accounting Economics, Review of Financial Studies, Journal of Financial Intermediaries- and Economic Policy. Therefore, 
class C is formed by 47 = 34 + 5 + 8 journals. 
 
• In brief, as indicated in the text, starting from the top 64 Kalaitzidakis et al. (2003) journals we have reached a total of 5 + 34 
+ 47 = 86 journals in classes A, B, and C, respectively, paying attention to the other rankings.  
 
We exclude six journals with six points in Lubrano et al. (2003) -that do not appear at all in the other classifications- and five 
journals with average rank between 60 and 70 in Kodrzycki and Yu (2006). 
 
Class A 
American Economic Review 
Econometrica 
Journal of Political Economy 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 
Review of Economic Studies. 
 
Class B 
American Political Science Review 
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European Economic Review 
Games and Economic Behavior 
International Economic Review 
Journal of Applied Econometrics 
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 
Journal of Econometrics 
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 
Journal of Economic Growth 
Journal of Economic Literature 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 
Journal of Economic Theory 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 
Journal of the European Economic Association 
Journal of Finance 
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 Number of Publications   
   University Rankings 
Econphd University  N = Number       P = Q = Quality     According to:  
Ranking of Faculty  A  B     C  D     Total       Index            P            Q 
            (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9)         (10)  
  
 
U.S.1 614      4,895 6,575 2,284 6,088  19,842 314,217 
  
           1 Harvard University 55 838 905 294 779 2,816 49,638 1 1 
2 University of Chicago 29 290 281 112 212 895 16,699 28 8 
3 MIT 37 425 446 168 390 1,429 25,088 8 4 
4 U. of California, Berkeley 56 450 623 273 662 2,008 29,645 2 2 
5 Princeton University 53 470 607 165 693 1,935 29,588 3 3 
6 Stanford University 38 272 291 90 264 917 16,049 24 9 
7 Northwestern University 35 230 307 87 280 904 14,607 26 11 
8 University of Pennsylvania 29 203 340 84 113 740 13,837 36 12 
9 Yale University 39 326 479 118 398 1,321 21,331 10 7 
10 New York University 44 351 535 129 439 1,454 23,278 7 6 
11 U. of California, LA  39 198 230 160 322 910 12,652 25 16 
13 Columbia University 44 381 533 199 463 1,576 24,892 5 5 
14 U. of Wisconsin, Madison 29 86 238 74 154 552 7,608 45 37 
15 Cornell University 32 156 391 182 472 1,201 13,669 12 13 
16 University of Michigan  55 219 369 149 447 1,184 15,636 13 10 
           
 
U.S.2 935 2,680 7,005 4,365 8,275 22,325 246,740 
  
           17 University of Maryland 36 144 246 219 283 892 11,047 29 22 
19 U. of Texas, Austin 31 114 243 120 328 805 9,253 32 29 
21 U. of Cal., San Diego 35 174 385 97 264 920 13,581 23 14 
22 University of Rochester 14 56 100 51 100 307 4,146 76 61 
23 Ohio State University 36 143 295 163 324 925 11,447 22 20 
25 U. of Illinois, Urbana 20 37 166 89 204 496 4,708 55 58 




27 Brown University 27 128 184 119 119 550 8,713 46 32 
28 U. California, Davis 31 54 185 159 243 641 6,132 41 46 
29 University of Minnesota 23 127 193 50 100 470 8,375 61 33 
32 U. of Southern California 22 62 263 110 355 790 7,440 33 38 
33 Michigan State U. 43 100 325 181 328 934 10,289 19 26 
35 Duke University 46 141 305 189 568 1,203 11,917 11 19 
38 PA State University 21 64 142 76 171 453 5,317 63 51 
40 Carnegie Mellon U. 21 46 92 26 61 225 3,437 79 71 
41 U. of North Carolina 22 20 142 62 182 406 3,484 67 70 
42 Boston College 22 69 221 113 209 612 6,962 43 40 
43 Georgetown University 18 84 161 74 132 451 6,351 64 45 
44 Texas A and M 22 47 161 103 163 474 5,076 60 53 
49 University of Indiana 25 28 153 130 170 481 4,365 58 60 
51 Johns Hopkins 12 59 147 46 67 319 4,908 75 56 
52 Rutgers University 34 42 161 163 342 708 5,415 38 50 
53 University of Virginia 28 67 157 126 142 492 5,933 57 47 
54 Vanderbilt University 32 98 296 240 541 1,175 10,341 14 25 
55 Georgetown University 23 42 170 63 73 348 4,681 73 59 
56 Arizona State University 24 59 243 171 333 806 7,364 31 39 
57 University of Arizona 17 30 80 65 77 252 2,867 77 76 
58 Dartmouth College 27 47 141 131 226 545 5,007 49 54 
60 University of Washington 24 80 257 132 152 621 7,999 42 34 
62 Iowa State University 40 31 191 324 567 1,113 6,616 15 42 
63 Washington U., St. Louis 29 130 243 163 217 753 10,040 35 27 
67 Purdue University 15 30 91 87 191 399 3,278 70 72 
70 University of Pittsburgh 20 36 142 50 174 402 4,044 68 62 
72 University of Iowa 13 26 124 41 57 248 3,203 78 73 
75 Rice University 18 63 152 88 205 508 5,533 53 49 
77 U. of California, Irvine 18 23 116 135 202 476 3,672 59 65 
78 University of Florida 11 23 97 78 204 402 3,047 69 75 
           
33 
 
           
 
EU1 329 630 2,326 1,050 3,595 7,601 69,985 
  
           12 London Sch. of Ecomics 49 162 345 90 270 867 12,465 30 18 
18 Toulouse University 76 124 406 193 791 1,514 12,999 6 15 
24 Tilburg University 47 35 353 222 1,131 1,741 9,158 4 30 
31 Oxford University 43 119 338 152 386 995 11,128 17 21 
34 University of Warwick 43 85 371 184 286 926 10,355 21 24 
37 University of Amsterdam 37 19 194 125 322 660 4,742 40 57 
39 Cambridge University 34 86 319 84 409 898 9,138 27 31 
           
 
EU2 438 488 2,487 1,286 4,939 9,200 69,480 
  
           45 European Institute 11 23 152 49 161 385 3,655 71 66 
46 U. Carlos III 46 14 171 74 352 611 3,921 44 64 
47 Univ. College London 35 164 329 111 324 928 12,485 20 17 
48 University of Essex 25 23 148 72 81 324 3,653 74 67 
59 Stockholm University 17 7 57 45 93 202 1,498 80 81 
65 University of York 42 56 222 81 419 778 6,475 34 44 
66 U. Pompeu Fabra 36 49 151 56 433 689 4,994 39 55 
68 University of Nottingham 48 28 300 210 833 1,371 7,713 9 36 
71 Stockholm School of Ecs. 17 16 106 80 347 549 3,057 47 74 
73 Erasmus University 18 5 123 60 282 470 2,687 62 79 
74 University of Copenhagen 39 11 161 67 259 498 3,516 54 68 
76 Catholic Univ. of Louvain 38 32 258 191 575 1,056 6,871 16 41 
79 U. Autónoma, Barcelona 30 15 95 63 375 548 2,778 48 77 
80 Free Univ. of Amsterdam 22 11 116 55 183 365 2,693 72 78 
81 University of Bonn 14 34 98 72 222 426 3,484 66 69 
           
 
RW 169 399 1,295 725 1,216 3,635 40,951 
  
           20 Univ. of British Columbia 27 73 188 110 160 531 6,560 50 43 
34 
 
36 University of Toronto 45 99 255 190 401 945 9,326 18 28 
61 Queen's University,  23 34 203 122 165 524 5,302 52 52 
64 University of Montreal 21 18 162 113 141 434 3,969 65 63 
30 University of Tel Aviv 17 90 240 68 130 528 7,738 51 35 
50 Hebrew University 22 69 152 91 181 493 5,767 56 48 
69 Hong Kong University 14 16 95 31 38 180 2,289 81 80 
           TOTAL 
 
2,485 9,092 19,688 9,710 24,113 62,603 741,373 
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Table 1. The Skewness of Productivity Distributions in the Original Sample 
 
  Percentage of Individuals     Percentage of Publications or Quality Points  
            In Category: Accounted for By Category: 
    1          2        3       4            1         2          3         4             
Number of Publications, P  65.6      22.3    7.9    4.1                   27.2    32.6     20.8    19.4     
Quality Index, Q  66.2      21.5    7.7    4.6                   25.7    31.4    20.8     22.2      
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Category 1 = individuals with low productivity, smaller than or equal to µ1; 
Category 2 = individuals with an intermediate productivity, above µ1 and smaller or equal to µ2; 
Category 3 = individuals with a remarkable productivity, above µ2 and smaller or equal to µ3; 
Category 4 = individuals with an outstanding productivity above µ3,  
 
where:  µ1 = mean of the productivity distribution;  
µ2 = mean productivity of individuals with productivity above µ1, 
µ3 = mean productivity of individuals with productivity above µ2.  
 
          Productivity Distributions 
  P     Q 
 
µ1    25.2     319 
µ2    54.4     719 













    16-19 20-23 24-27 28-31 32-35 36-39 40-57    All 
      I   II  III  IV   V  VI  VII  Cohorts 
 
  NUMBER OF 
 INDIVIDUALS   216 198 195 164 167 105   91   1,136 
 




  Periods 
1. µ (xc)     158.5 194.2 191.8 179.7 165.2 199.8 206.2 182.1 
 
2. µ (y1
c)    153.4 174.1 160.6 147.5 152.2 188.9 189.0 163.3 
 
3. µ (y2
c)      116.5 113.4 125.6 134.6 158.4 125.8 
 
4. µ (y3
c)        96.2 114.1 121.5 107.7 
 
5. µ (y4
c)            84.7   84.7 
 
PRODUCTIVITY PER YEAR 
 6. First Period, µ(xc/8)    19.8   24.3   24.0   22.5   20.6   25.0   25.8   22.8 
 
        7. Second Period, µ[yc/(Tc - 8)]   18.1   19.2   16.7   14.4   15.2   16.3   16.0   16.8 
 
8. Aggregate, µ[(xc + yc)/Tc]   18.8   21.1   19.0   16.6   16.5   18.2   17.7   18.4 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 





c, and yc4 = Successive Eight-year Periods 
 
(xc + yc)  = Aggregate Distribution 
 





Table 3.A. Age/Productivity Profiles. Entire Cohorts’ Sample 
  Coefficients  Std. Error  
Variables*:        
Period      -4.13     1.21   
(Period)2      0.00     0.03   
Gender     69.80   10.31   
University Type I             123.88     7.38   
University Type II  31.60     7.85   
University Type III  14.11     8.21   
Constant               100.52   17.45   
* Six cohort dummies are insignificant 
N = 3,498 
Adjusted R2 = 0.158 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 3.B. Age/Productivity Profiles. Highly Productive Individuals  
  Coefficients           Std. Error  
Variables*:        
Period        1.12        3.57   
(Period)2      -0.18        0.08  
Gender      70.98        55.66     
Cohort I  -101.94      33.91  
Cohort IV    -73.37       31.78   
Cohort V   -58.74       28.65   
Constant                 376.96      75.25   
* Remaining cohort dummies, as well as University Type variables are insignificant 
N = 690 





Table 3.C. Age/Productivity Profiles. Rest of the Cohorts Sample  
  Coefficients           Std. Error  
Variables*:        
Period       -5.32      0.79   
(Period)2       0.042       0.019  
Gender      33.18       6.25     
University Type I                 -8.49      7.21   
University Type II    23.73       4.82     
Cohort V    -12.88      6.16  
Constant                 376.96                  75.25 
* Remaining cohort dummies, as well as the University Type III variable are insignificant 
N = 2,808 





Table 4. Productivity Inequality in Selected Periods After Completion of the PhD 
 
 
    16-19 20-23 24-27 28-31 32-35 36-39 40-57          
      I   II  III  IV   V  VI  VII  All Cohorts 
 
PRODUCTIVITY 
  INEQUALITY 
 
 Eight-year 
   Periods 
 
I1(x
c)     0.264 0.306 0.389 0.311 0.380 0.331 0.341 I1(x)  0.334 
 
I1(y1
c)     0.287 0.344 0.352 0.425 0.474 0.470 0.426 I1(y1)  0.388 
 
I1(y2
c)       0.495 0.493 0.535 0.511 0.659 I1(y2)  0.539 
 
I1(y3
c)         0.894 0.747 0.622 I1(y3)  0.776 
 
I1(y4




c)   0.285 0.343 0.352 0.393 0.477 0.416 0.449 I1(y )  0.456 
 
Aggregate, I1(x




Table 5. Mobility Matrices for All Cohorts 
 
                  
    COHORT I       COHORT II 
 
  x/y   1.          2.          3.         4.         5.  Total   x/y   1.          2.          3.         4.         5.  Total 
 
  1.  22         10          7           3          3     45   1.   22          9          6          2           1     40  
48.9      22.2      15.6       6.7       6.7   100.0    55.0      22.5      15.0        5.0       2.5    100.0 
   
  2.  10         16          7          7           4     44   2.   6         13           8          9          4     40 
 22.7      36.4      15.9      15.9       9.1   100.0    15.0      32.5      20.0      22.5      10.0   100.0 
 
  3.    8          12         10          7           4      41   3.     8         11         10          6          4      39 
 19.5      29.3      24.4      17.1        9.8    100.0    20.5      28.1      25.6      15.4      10.3    100.0 
 
  4.    4           6          9          18          6      43   4.    4          6          13          8           9      40 
  9.3      13.9      20.9      41.9      13.9   100.0    10.0      15.0      32.5      20.0      22.5    100.0 
 
  5.    0            1           8           8         26      43   5.    0          2           2         14         21      39 
 0.0          2.3       18.6     18.6      60.5    100.0    0.0        5.1        5.1      35.9       53.8   100.0 
 
Total  44         45         41         43         43      216   Total  40         41         39         39         39      198 






COHORT III       COHORT IV 
 
  x/y   1.          2.          3.         4.         5.  Total   x/y   1.          2.          3.         4.         5.  Total 
 
  1.  21         13          3          1          1     39   1.   21          7          4           2          0     34  
53.8      33.3       7.7       2.6       2.6   100.0    61.8      20.6      11.8       5.9       0.0    100.0 
   
  2.  12           9         12          4         2     39   2.   6          11           9          5          1     32 
 30.8      23.1      30.8     10.3      5.1   100.0    18.7      34.4      28.1      15.6       3.1    100.0 
 
  3.    3          10          2          9          5      39   3.    4          7            8          7          7      33 
 7.7       25.6      30.8     23.1      12.8    100.0    12.1      21.2       24.2     21.2     21.2    100.0 
 
  4.    3           6         11         13          6      39   4.    2          5          9         11          7      34 
 7.7         5.4      28.2      33.3      15.4   100.0    5.9      14.7      26.5      32.3      20.6     100.0 
 
  5.    0          1           1         12         25      39   5.    1           2          3          8         17      31 
0.0        2.6        2.6       30.8      64.1   100.0      3.2       6.4       9.7      25.8      54.8   100.0 
 
Total  39         39         39         39         39      195   Total  34         32         33         33         32      164 











    COHORT V       COHORT VI 
 
  x/y   1.          2.          3.         4.         5.  Total   x/y   1.          2.          3.         4.         5.  Total 
 
  1.  17          7          5           5          0     34   1.   12          6          1          2          0     21  
50.0      20.6      14.7      14.7       0.0   100.0    57.1      28.6        4.8       9.5       0.0   100.0 
   
  2.   10         12           5           5        1     33   2.   4           7           6          3          1     21 
 30.3      36.4        15.1      15.1    3.0    100.0    19.0      33.3      28.6      14.3      4.8    100.0 
 
  3.    6           6           9          6          7      34   3.     4          4          4          7          2      21 
 17.6      17.6      26.5      17.6      20.6    100.0    19.0     19.0      19.0      33.3      9.5    100.0 
 
  4.    0          7          9           7         10      34   4.    1          3          6          3           8      21 
 0.0      21.2      27.3      21.2      30.3   100.0    4.8      14.3      28.6      14.3      38.1     100.0 
 
  5.    1           1          6          10         15      33   5.    0           1          4          6           10      21 
  3.0       3.0      18.2       30.3      45.4    100.0    0.0        4.8      19.0      28.6       47.6   100.0 
 
Total  34         33         34         33         33      167   Total  22         21         21         21         21      105 






COHORT VII         
 
  x/y   1.          2.          3.         4.         5.  Total     
 
  1.   9           5           2          2          1      19     
47.4      26.3      10.5      10.5       5.3   100.0      
   
  2.   6           6          2           3          1      18    
 33.3      33.3      11.1      16.7      5.6   100.0      
 
  3.    3           4           5           2          4       18     
 16.7      22.2      27.8      11.1      22.2    100.0     
 
  4.    0           3          7           2          6       18    
  0.0      16.7       38.9      11.1      33.3     100.0      
 
  5.    1          0           2           9          6       18     
 5.6        0.0        11.1      50.0      33.3     100.0      
 
Total   19         18         18        18         18       91     











      16-19 20-23 24-27 28-31 32-35 36-39 40-57                        ALL COHORTS 
      I   II  III  IV   V  VI  VII    
PRODUCTIVITY 
    MOBILITY 
 
  Eight-year 
    Periods  
   M1(x
c,  y1
c)     0.151  0.104  0.172  0.033  0.075 - 0.014  0.092 M1(x,y1)                       0.099 
 




c)      0.192  0.041  0.098  0.005  -0.038 M1(x,y1+ y2)                 0.062 
 






c)         0.028 - 0.037  -0.041 M1(x y1+ y2+ y3)       - 0.001 
 












       A.  M1(x
c,  y c)     0.158  0.087  0.188 0.012  0.022  -0.027 -0.056     M1(x, y )          - 0.030 
 
      B. EM1(x
c,  y c)     0.193  0.151  0.125 0.173  0.184  0.151 0.161     EM1(x, y )               0.190 
 
      C. SM1(x




ALL COHORTS:        M1(x, y )  = Σc βc M1(x
c, yc) + {Σc (wc - vc) I1(x
c) + [I1(m
1,..., mC)] - I1(µ
1,..., µC)]}/I1(x) 
 




Table 7. The Skewness of Productivity Distributions (xc + y c) for All Cohorts 
 
    Percentage of Individuals        Percentage of Publications Accounted for 
(xc + y c)           In Category:      By Category: 
 1        2         3         4             1         2          3           4  
CI, 16-19       (216 ind.) 57.9     36.1      4.6      1.4                   31.4    51.3      12.0         5.3       
CII, 20-23      (198 ind.)                   42.9     38.9    12.6      5.5         16.7     41.5      23.8       18.0  
CIII, 24-27    (195 ind.)                   42.6     36.9    14.4       6.2    15.0     36.9      26.5       21.6       
CIV, 28-31     (164 ind.)                   42.7     33.5    14.6       9.1    14.0     34.4      25.8       25.8      
CV, 32-35      (167 ind.)                   40.7     30.5    19.2       9.6    11.4     26.6      32.0       30.1       
CVI, 36-39    (105 ind.)                    32.4     30.5    18.1     19.0      7.6     21.7      24.2       46.4       
CVII, 40-57   ( 91 ind.) 29.7     29.7    16.5     24.2     6.8      20.0      19.3       53.9       
 
ALL   COHORTS 43.3     34.5    13.5       8.7         14.6      33.4     23.5       28.1       
(1,136 individuals) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Category 1 = individuals with low productivity, smaller than or equal to µ1; 
Category 2 = individuals with an intermediate productivity, above µ1 and smaller or equal to µ2; Category 3 = individuals 
with a remarkable productivity, above µ2 and smaller or equal to µ3; 
Category 4 = individuals with an outstanding productivity above µ3,  
 
where:  µ1 = mean of the productivity distribution;  
µ2 = mean productivity of individuals with productivity above µ1, 
µ3 = mean productivity of individuals with productivity above µ2.  
 
   
    16-19  20-23  24-27  28-31  32-35  36-39   40-57  
      Q      I     II    III    IV     V    VI    VII           All Cohorts 
 
µ1,       319  331    451    482    492    552    680    775     501 
 
µ2     719  538    658    713    738   825   929 1,026     755 
 







Table 8. Number of Individuals by Cohort, and Average Productivity in Selected Periods After Completion of the 
PhD With a Less Elitist Quality Index 
 
   
    16-19 20-23 24-27 28-31 32-35 36-39 40-57    All 
      I   II  III  IV   V  VI  VII  Cohorts 
 
  NUMBER OF 
 INDIVIDUALS   216 198 195 164 167 105   91   1,136 
 




  Periods 
1. µ (xc)     98.4 116.7 114.6 105.8 96.5 115.4 113.5 107.9 
 
2. µ (y1
c)    95.3 106.2 97.3 89.3 92.0 110.8 107.6   98.6 
 
3. µ (y2
c)      72.0 71.4 79.3 83.2   93.6   77.9 
 
4. µ (y3
c)        61.0 72.4   73.7   67.5 
 
5. µ (y4
c)             52.7   52.7 
 
PRODUCTIVITY PER YEAR 
 6. First Period, µ(xc/8)    12.3   14.6   14.3   13.2   12.1   14.4   14.2   13.5 
 
        7. Second Period, µ[yc/(Tc - 8)]   11.3   11.8   10.2   8.9   9.4   10.0   9.5   10.3 
 
8. Aggregate, µ[(xc + yc)/Tc]   11.7   12.8   11.5   10.1   10.1   11.0   10.3   11.2 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 





c, and yc4 = Successive Eight-year Periods 
 
(xc + yc)  = Aggregate Distribution 
 





Table 9. Productivity Inequality in Selected Periods After Completion of the PhD With a Less Elitist Quality Index 
 
 
    16-19 20-23 24-27 28-31 32-35 36-39 40-57          
      I   II  III  IV   V  VI  VII  All Cohorts 
 
PRODUCTIVITY 
  INEQUALITY 
 
 Eight-year 
   Periods 
 
I1(x
c)     0.225 0.272 0.343 0.276 0.335 0.305 0.317 I1(x)  0.295 
 
I1(y1
c)     0.294 0.310 0.302 0.383 0.419 0.437 0.398 I1(y1)  0.345 
 
I1(y2
c)       0.433 0.445 0.481 0.467 0.593 I1(y2)  0.481 
 
I1(y3
c)         0.813 0.681 0.553 I1(y3)  0.703 
 
I1(y4




c)   0.251 0.310 0.302 0.357 0.429 0.386 0.407 I1(y )  0.413 
 
Aggregate, I1(x




Table 10. Productivity Mobility in Selected Transformations With a Less Elitist Quality Index 
 
 
      16-19 20-23 24-27 28-31 32-35 36-39 40-57                        ALL COHORTS 
      I   II  III  IV   V  VI  VII    
PRODUCTIVITY 
    MOBILITY 
 
  Eight-year 
    Periods  
   M1(x
c,  y1
c)     0.142  0.102  0.187  0.026  0.079 - 0.028  0.083 M1(x,y1)                      0.098 
 




c)     0.210  0.024  0.100  -0.010  -0.043 M1(x,y1+ y2)                0.060 
 






c)         0.022 - 0.052  -0.039 M1(x y1+ y2+ y3)      - 0.009 
 












       A.  M1(x
c,  y c)     0.143  0.083  0.207 -0.008  0.012  -0.043 -0.047     M1(x, y )         - 0.041 
 
      B. EM1(x
c,  y c)     0.198  0.158  0.129 0.176  0.191  0.146 0.155     EM1(x, y )              0.203 
 
      C. SM1(x




ALL COHORTS:        M1(x, y )  = Σc βc M1(x
c, yc) + {Σc (wc - vc) I1(x
c) + [I1(m
1,..., mC)] - I1(µ
1,..., µC)]}/I1(x) 
 
     - 0.041 =  0.055  - 0.043 - 0.053 
51 
 
Table 11. The Skewness of Productivity Distributions (xc + y c) for All Cohorts With a Less Elitist Quality Index 
    Percentage of Individuals        Percentage of Publications Accounted for 
           In Category:      By Category: 
 1        2         3         4           1         2          3           4  
QUALITY INDEX, Q  66.2     21.5      7.7     4.6      25.7     31.4     20.8       22.2      
(2,485 individuals) 
COHORTS  
CI, 16-19       (216 ind.) 56.5     36.6      6.0      0.9                   31.9    49.8      15.0         3.2       
CII, 20-23      (198 ind.)                   42.9     37.4    15.1      4.5         17.9     39.2      28.4       14.5  
CIII, 24-27    (195 ind.)                   40.0     39.5    13.8       6.7    15.2     38.6      24.9       21.3       
CIV, 28-31     (164 ind.)                   42.7     32.3    16.5       8.5    15.0     33.3      28.5       23.2      
CV, 32-35      (167 ind.)                   37.7     32.3    19.2       10.8    11.2     27.3      30.3       31.2       
CVI, 36-39    (105 ind.)                    32.4     29.5    19.0     19.0      8.3     21.1      25.2       45.4       
CVII, 40-57   ( 91 ind.) 29.7     28.6    16.5     25.3      7.6    19.3      18.7       54.2       
 
ALL   COHORTS 42.2     34.7    14.4       8.7         15.3      33.1     24.9       26.7       
(1,136 individuals) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Category 1 = individuals with low productivity, smaller than or equal to µ1; 
Category 2 = individuals with an intermediate productivity, above µ1 and smaller or equal to µ2;  
Category 3 = individuals with a remarkable productivity, above µ2 and smaller or equal to µ3; 
Category 4 = individuals with an outstanding productivity above µ3,  
 
where:  µ1 = mean of the productivity distribution;  
µ2 = mean productivity of individuals with productivity above µ1, 
µ3 = mean productivity of individuals with productivity above µ2.  
  
    16-19  20-23  24-27  28-31  32-35  36-39   40-57  
      Q      I     II    III    IV     V    VI    VII           All Cohorts 
 
µ1,       194  206    274    292    299    337    410    450     304 
 
µ2     426  119    193    233    198   301   330 592     445 
 
µ3  675  542 598 657 619 693 761 788  677 
  
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
